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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LE·STEH RALPH ROMERO and 
\1.\XINE HO~IERO, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
\'ICri,OR ~Clll\1 lDT and RAE 
SCII ~IIDT, his wife; TOM B. WILCOX 
and ~I H~. TO~I \YILCOX, his wife; 
and MR. ART CASEY and MARIE 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action to foreclose real estate contract as note and 
mortgage. Respondents allege .tender of paymen1Js prior 
to notice of acceleration hy Appellants and estoppel as 
a defense. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Those elements necessary to prove PJaintiffs' and 
Appellants' case were admitted and the defens·es alleged 
were tried by the court sitting as a court of equity with 
an advisory jury. Judgment of no cause of aJCtion was 
entered against Plaintiffs and .Appellants and fl"om that 
judgment Appellants have appeal·ed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE~AL 
Defendants and Respondents ·see:k judgment of thi~ 
court .affirming the judgment of the Distriet Court of 
no cause of action in favor of Defendants-Respondents 
and against Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
STATEI\1ENT OF FACTrS 
For purpos·es of convenience Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants will hereinafter he referred to as Appellants. 
Defendants and Respondents Victor Schmidt rand Rae 
Schmidt, his wife, win hereinafte·r sometimes be referred 
to as Schmidt or Schmidts; Defendants and R.espondents 
Tom B. Wilcox and Mrs. Tom Wilcox, his wife, will 
hereinafter sometimes be referred to as Wilcox or Wil-
coxs and Defendants and Respondents Mr. Art Casey 
and Marie Crusey, his wife, will hereinafter sometimes 
be refer~ed to as Casey or Caseys. 
Inasmuch as Appellants have failed to elucidate all 
pertinent facts in connection with thi·s appeal, Respon-
dents invite the court's attention to the evidence and 
record in the following particulars. 
Appellants as sellers and Respondents Schmidt as 
buyers entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
for the purchase and sale of 325 Oakley Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R-7 and 8). S.aid Uniform Real Estate 
Contract is nO't dated but shows that the rbuyer is to 
receive p<Yssession of the described prorperty on July 17, 
1961. The eontra0t is in the standard form 'and that 
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3 
pr·ovision under paragraph-! of the Uni~onn Real Est.wte 
Contraet providing for the date from which interest is 
to be charged is blank ( R-7 and 8). 
rrhe Respondents Schmidt Inade each of the pay-
IIH'Ilt:-; maturing on the contract promptly as they came 
due to and including the payment of August, 1962 (R-
100). In September of 1962 the Respondents Schmidt 
a~~igned their interest in said Uniform Real E'siate 
Contract to the Respondents Wilcox who accepted the 
same with the idea and ~or the purpose of reselling 
the property (R-109). On or .about September 26, 19·62 
\Yilcox entered into an Earnest 1\foney Receipt ·and Offer 
to Purchase with Respondents Casey (Ex. 3-P). The 
real estate broker through whom said Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was procurred was Alder-
\Vallace Inc. (R-129, lines 13-19). Wilcox and his part-
ner, James Richard Glavas (R-109, lines 24-28) contacted 
Appellant Lester Romero andjor Romero's associate, 
John "\V. Taylor several times concerning the unpaid 
balance due on the Uniform Real Estate Oontract (R-
110-118; R 147-151; R 156-159). Romero was also con-
tacted on two oooasions ·by H. Mervin Wallace, broker 
for Alder-"\Y allace, Inc., the real estate agent handling 
the transaction between Wilcox and Caseys (R 131-133). 
During the cours·e of an early conversation between 
Taylor, Glavas, Romero and Wilcox (R 158-159) a dis-
crepancy in the contract balance w.as noted and Mr. 
Romero stated to Mr. Taylor, "John, work it out with 
them, see what you can do. See if you can get the prob-
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lems solved." (R.159, lines 14-15). Thereafter the parties 
had various meetings in .an attempt to work the problem 
out but were never able to harmonize their divergencies. 
During ~the course of ~these negotiations Wilcox gave 
Ro·mero his personal check for $89.00 (R 113, lines 18 
to 20). Thi'S cheek was dishonored by the bank. The 
check (Ex. 2-P) shows on the back thereof that it was 
sent through the clearing houS'e twice, the firsi time on 
October 9, 1962 and the second time on October 15, 1962 
and that it was finally returned to the Appellant Romero 
on the 18th day of October, 1962. Romero immediately 
took the check ~to the office of his attorney (R. 161). 
No fuDther notice was given by Romero to Respondents 
or to Wallace that negotiations were ceased and that 
strict performance was demanded (R 161-162) and on 
October 24, 1962, Romero's caused a notice (R 9 and 
10) to be served upon Respondents wherein Rom eros 
elected under the provision of paragraph 16~( c) of the 
Uniform Real ES'tate ·Contract (Ex. 1-P) to treat said 
contraCJt as 1a note and mortgage ; to declare ~the entire 
unpaid balance on 'Said conract to be immediately due 
and payable, and to foreclose isaid mort~ruge and note. 
Payment was not n1ade of the full balance demanded 
and on January ·of 1963 Romero commenced :this ootion 
for foreclosure. 
The record will show that the Appellants could have 
received all payments due on the contract (R 131-133) 
and in point of fact all payments due on ~the contract 
have been paid to Romero who has received and credited 
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the same to his account since the decision of ·the trial 
('ourt in conne<--tion with this 1natter. At no time have 
Ute Ht>~pondents or either of .them attempted to :r-enig 
on their obligation or to give Appellants anything less 
than they were entitled to under the terms of the Uniform 
Heal E~tate Contract. All ·efforts of Respondents have 
been directed toward obtaining 'a correct contract bal-
anee upon which Respondents Casey could rely in accept-
ing the buyer's interest in said Uniform Real Estate 
Contract .and agreeing to assume and pay the same. 
Hespondents have •at all times been willing to pay Appel-
lant~ all sUins due to them (R 33 Affirmative Defense 
Xo. 5). Appellants are entirely whole in this trans-
aetion and would not lose one cent as 1the result of the 
judgment entered by the trial court. Respondents have 
made no e:ffurt to avoid payment or to as'Sel'lt thaJt the 
balance of the contract was more than Appellants were 
l'ntitled to, 'but have been willing, rut all times, ~to fully 
comply with the terms of the contract, upon receipt of 
certain necessary coopel"ation from Romero which Ro-
mero failed to provide. These facts will be more fully 
developed in the following argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENTS MADE A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
TENDER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENTS TO APPELLANTS' 
PRIOR TO APPELLANTS' NOTICE ACCELERATING THE 
BALANCE DUE UNDER THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT, THUS CUTTING OFF APPELLANTS' RIGHT 
TO FORECLOSE SAID UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CON-
TRACT. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The law concerning tender of delinquencies prior 
to notice accelerating the full unpaid balance is succinctly 
stated in the following teX!t from 36 Am. J ur. :l\lortgages, 
Section 400, pages 887-88: 
Although there is authority to the contrary, 
the preVIailing rule is to the effect that a tender 
of arrears due on a mortgage containing an ac-
celeration clause, made before the holder of the 
mortgage has eX!ercis-ed his option to declare the 
entire amount of the debt due, prevents the exer-
cise of such option. 
Was there, in this case, a le~ally sufficient tender 
of delinquent payments, prior to notice by appellants, 
accelerating the balance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract1 
H. Mervin Wallace, the broker for Alder-Wallace, 
Inc., the company brokering the sale of rthe subject 
proper1ty from Wilcox to Casey ( R 129, lines 6-19) stated 
in his ~testimony that he had a convers-ation by telephone 
with the appeHant, Les,ter Romero, on Friday, October 
12, 19,62 (R 130, line 29) and again on Octoiber 15, 1962. 
(R. 131 lines 24-28). In the telephone conversation of 
Octo her 15, 1962, H. M·ervin Wallace stated : 
A. !That if there was any delinquency the 
contract would be brought to date; that our people 
were taking it over a:s of October 1 ; ~and, if ~there 
was any delinquency, it would be brought to date. 
(R 113, lines 24-27). 
At the time of this conversation vVaHace was holding 
money in his rtrust account of a 'Sum sufficient to pay ·all 
delinquencies on the contract (R 133, line 30 and 134, 
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lines 1-4). 'Yallace had authority to disburse these funds 
in any manner necessary ·t:o clos·e the deal (R 143, lines 
~7 -30 and R 136, lines 19-25). 
In 3~ Aln. J ur. on Tender, Sechon 24, page 232, 
we read: 
That where the condition is one which the 
debtor has the right to insist ·on, a tender made 
subject to that condition is valid. (See also 
Woods vs. Dbcon, 93 Ore. 681, 240 P2d. 520). 
It is submitted that under •the facls of thi·s oose 
there was a tender and that the condition attached to 
the tender of payment ·of all delinquencies on the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract was one upon which the 
respondents had a right to insist. Inasmuch as the 
respondents Casey were agreeing to a;ssume and p:ay 
a contract, it was necessary that they know the balance 
thereof (R 129, lines 23-30, R 134, lines 11-15). Appel-
lants 'have maintained throughout that this balance could 
have been mathematically ascertained by the respondents, 
independent of .any action hy appellants. The fallacy 
of this argwnent lies in the fact that respondent Wilcox 
made various attempts to obtain the correct balance as 
did H. :Mervin Wallace (R 111-112, R 113, lines 18-27, 
R 114, lines 6-29, R 117, lines 11-27 R 131, 132 and 133). 
Xotwithstanding each of these attempts the halance ·oo. 
the contract which Romero gave was incorrect. The 
balance which Romero gave as of September, but would 
not confirm, was $11,417.7 4 or $11,328.7 ±, depending on 
the interpretation of the conversation between Wallace 
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and Romero on October 15, 1962, ( R 141, lines 26-30, 
R 142, lines 1-8), where·as the actual and correct balance 
on said contract of August 1, 1962, was $11,147.75 (R. 
126, lines 15-17). Interest on the co·rrect balance to 
September would he approximately $61.00, learving a dis-
crepancy of $120.00 to $209.00. To expect ra buyer to 
assume an obh~ation the exact extent of which could 
no!t he verified by the creditor would make the transfer 
of 'proper.ty in ~the modern commercial world impossible. 
The buyer would he unwilling to assume a balance unless 
he could verify if ~that was the amount due and that 
verification must come from the creditor. This would 
then m~ake it impossible for a seller ~to sell. 
One further argument rs pertinent with reference 
to the appellants' contention that respondents could have 
made ~the simple mathematical calculation necessary to 
determine the unpaid balance of the contract (Appel-
lants' Brief, page 11). The Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract (Exhibit 1-P), under paragraph 4 is silent on the 
date from which interest is to be charged. The rate 
of intere~st is sta1ted but t'he date at which it is to com-
mence is not mentioned and the balance could, therefore, 
he calculated only by the mutual cons·ent of Romero and 
respondents, or their agent. Respondents were, there-
£ore, placed in a position where it was necessary to 
obtain the information requested from Romero prior 
to stating a balance on the contract Oaseys would be 
required to assume and pay. 
Appellant ·stated to the Court in his brief, page 5; 
that there is no showing ~that the tender occurred prior 
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to the date of notice accelerating the balance on the 
<'On tract. There is testimony of H. .l\lervin Wallace in 
the record that his tender of payments to Romero wa:s 
made on October 15, 1962 (R 133, lines 12-30, R 134, 
lines 1-ti, R 136, lines 19-25). The Court had this testi-
mony before it and concluded that: 
The tender to Plaintiffs of all delinquent pay-
ments on the contract wa;s made prior ~to the 
time notice was given by Plaintiffs in which they 
s·tated their intentions to accelerate the balance 
due under the U ni~orm Real E·state Contract be-
twePn Plaintiffs a;s Sellers and Defendant Schmidt 
as Buyers. (R 83, Findings of F 1act No. 3). 
It is an undisputed fact that the notice accelerating the 
payments was dated October 24, 1962 ( R 9 and 10) 
which was 9 days subsequent to the date of tender by 
Mr. Wallace, agent for Wilcox and Case~. 
Appellant also cites in his brief p:age 5 the dis-
agreement between the testimony of Romero and W al-
lace. Wallace testified that he had made a tender and· 
Romero testified that he had not. This disparity in 
testimony was resolved by the finder of the :facts in 
favor of Wallace's testimony (R 83, Finding of Fact 
Xo. 3). There is evidence in the record to support the 
finding ( R 133 lines 12-30; R 134 lines 1-6 ; ~ 136 lines 
19-25) and this finding by the trial Oourt should not 
be disturbed. 
Appellant further argues that since the check of 
Wilcox marked insufficient funds was not returned to 
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Romero until October 18, 1962, and that since the con-
versation between Romero ~and W alla0e took pJace on 
October 15, 1962, Romero could not, at the time of his 
conversation with \TV allace, have known that the con-
tract was in default (Appellant's Brief, pages 5 and 6). 
A cursory examination of the check (Exhibit 2-P) shows 
on the back thereof that the check went through the 
clearing house ~twice, once on October 9, 1962, and once 
on October 15, 1962. The first of these date'S was 6 
days prior to the conversation between Romero and W al-
lace and the second one on the date of the conversation 
between Romero and Wallace. The date of October 18, 
1962, was the date on which it was finally returned to 
Les'ter Romero but since it h.ad been dishonored as early 
as October 9, 1962, Ro,mero could have had notice of 
the dishonor prior to his conversation on October 15, 
1962, with W~aHace. This conclusion is further fortified 
by the fact that the check went through the clearing 
house twice. It could only be concluded that it was sent 
through a second time at the instruction of the depositor 
who would have h.ad notice of its dishonor on the first 
deposit. 
In addition, Romero told Wallace in their conversa-
tion of October 15, 1962, that the contract was in default 
(R 133, lines 5-9, R 140, lines 26-30, R 141, line 1). Romero 
could only have made this :statement to Wallace in truth 
if he ~mew .at the time that the check had been dishonored, 
inasmuch as the contract would nO't have been in default 
had the check not been dishonored. 
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At thP eonclusion of the l"vidence, the Court sub-
mitted the ca8e to the advisory jury for a special verdict. 
Interrogatory 3 in said special verdict asked: "Did the 
~ehmidt~ or anyone acting in their behalf make a tender 
of payment to the Romeros~" Answer, "Yes" (R 80). 
This finding by the advisory jury, which finding 
wa~ adopted by the Court, is sustainable by evidence in 
the record and is a conclusive answer to appellant's con-
tention that no tender was made. The te~stimony of W .al-
laeP (R 133 lines 24-27 and R 136, lines 19..:25) is clearly 
sufficient to sustain such a finding hy the advisory jury 
and by the Court. The findings of the ·advisory jury 
and Court that a valid tender was made to appellants 
prior to their notice ·accelerating the balance on the 
contract, and the judgment of the Court entered 8JS a 
corollary thereto, should be sustained. 
It is further submitted to the 'Court in connection 
with this argument th.at a tender beyond that which was 
made to Romero would have been useless. Wallace testi-
fied that: 
A. ". . . When I asked (Romero) if I could 
use that figure, as a closing figure, he ~told me he 
was going to foreclose on the place." (R 133, lines 
5-9). 
The attitude of Romero .as disclosed by the entire record 
was that he failed to cooperate in ·arriving at the balance. 
on the contract and that on October 15, 1962, he was 
going to foreclose on the place. In 52 Am. J ur. on· 
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Tender, page 218, section 5, we read under the heading 
"Necessity in Equity", the following: 
As at law, an actual tender by the debtor is un-
necessary when it is plain, from the aets or con-
duct of the other party or the circumstances or. 
situations of a transaction or property, that a 
tender would be nugatory, since equity does not 
require a useless and idle £ormality. 
The illustration of this point states : 
A further illustration of the rule in equity, it 
has been held that a tender of the amount due 
on a contract for the sale of real estate is not 
necessary, if the vendor states that it will be 
useless. 
I~t is submitted that 'had the money been displayed 
to Romero on October 15, as Mr. Barker, in his Brief, 
(pages 9 and 10) argues, there is ample evidence to 
support a conclusion that Romero would have rejected 
and repudiated such a tender (R 123, lines 5-9). In con-
nection with this argument, see also 55 Am. J ur., Vendor' 
and Purchaser, Section 601, pages 994-995 and Clark, 
et al v. Paddock (Idaho) 132 Pac. 795. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED BY THEIR ACTS AND 
OMISSIONS TO EXERCISE THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE 
IN 'THE UNIFORM REAL EST~TE CONTRACT AND TO 
FORECLOSE SAID CONTRACT AS A NOTE AND MORT-
GAGE. 
In the Florida cruse of River Holding Compa;ny v. 
Nickel, et ux, 62 So. 2d., 702, the Florida Court observed: 
A court of equity is a forum f'Or the administra-
tion of justice. 
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In thP rPnmt California case of Bisno, et al v. Sax, 
d ul, :1·Hi P~d. S 14, the Court observed that: 
Equity does not wait upon precedent which 
exaetly squares with the facts in controversy, but 
will a~~ert itself in those situations where right 
and justice would be defeated, but for its inter-
VPntion. 
l.n 36 Am. Jur. on Mortgages, Section 398, page. 
~~ti, the following statement is made: 
The :\l.ortgagee may be estopped from exer-
cising an option to accelerate the maturity of the 
Inortgage by hi:s conduct, as where he has wrong-
fully prevented the payment .and thereby caused 
the default creating the option. 
It i~ the contention of respondents that the appel-
bmts .are e~topped from exercising the option to accel-
erate the contract by their conduct (R 41, Affirmative 
Defense No. 3, R 51, pa:vagraph 2). 
The Court submitted the following question to the 
advisory jury : 
5. Did the Romeros fail or refuse to reason-
ably participate in proceedings or measures that 
would determine the ·exact amount then on the 
contract? 
A: Yes (R 80, Interrogatory No. 5). 
1.,he Court adopted this finding in its Findings of Fact 
(R 83, Finding No.2). There is evidence to support this·· 
finding in the testimony of Glavas. (R 113, lines 18~27, 
R 114, R 117, lines 22 to 29) and in the testimony of 
\\~ allace (R 171, lines 7 to 13). The record is clear that 
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appellants or appellants' agent, John Taylor, never at 
any time gave to respondents or r-espondents' agent the 
correct balance on the contract. Romero, in his testi-
mony, stated that the balance on the contract as of 
September was $11,417.74 (R. 160, lines 15 to 18). The 
corr:ect balance on the contract as of August was $11,-
14 7. 7 5 ( R. 126, lines 15 to 18). This is a discrepancy 
of $269.99, less accrued interest of approximately $61.00 
to show the respective figures on parallel dates or a dis-
crepancy of approximately $208.99. Respondents were 
led to believe that Romero would cooperate with them 
in adjusting this discrepancy in figures and in working 
the problem out. Under examination by his cousel, 
Romero testified as follows (R 159 lines 3-16) : 
Q. What transpired then~ 
A. They said : "We would like to talk to 
you for ~a few minutes." 
I said: "I am on my way to an appointment, 
but I will be happy to sit down to see if we can 
work it out." 
They s.aid: "We need a balance." 
I went and got John; I said, "John, do you 
have the balance for these people~" 
He said, "Yes". So, we sat down and started 
talking about what the bal~ance w.as and it looked 
like it was going into a long conversation. I had 
to get off to my appointment. 
I said, "John, work it out with them; see what 
you can do. See if you can get the b.alance solved." 
So I left at that time. 
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The1·eafter, various meetings were held between 
"John" (John \V. Taylor, an associate of Romero) (R 
145 and 1-l()) at which the parties attempted to work. 
oui the di~en'pancy and come to a correct balance. These 
m'gotiations were terminated when Romeros, by and 
through tiH'ir attorney, and without further notice to 
\rilcox or ~ehmidt, and without giving them any oppor-
tunity to remedy the default, served notice terminating~ 
the lntyers' rights in the contract and exercising iheir 
election to accelerate the ba:lance due (R 9-10). Respon-
dent~ ~ubmit to the ~Court that to allow appellants to 
have judgment against respondents, Wilcox and Schmidt 
for a sum in excess of $11,500.00 together with attorney 
fees, without first having given said respondents an 
opportunity to remedy the default prior to notice of 
acceleration is precisely that type of inequitable conduct 
8poken of in the .Am. Jur. citation at section 398 of' 
~[ortgages, which should estop the appellants from accel-
erating the maturity of the mortgage. 
This principle is weU recognized by the Uta:h Su-
preme Court. In ~the case of Paoific Development Com-
pany v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P2d, 7 48, the Court 
dealt with the question of whether a seller could be 
l'~topped by his conduct toward the buyer, leading the 
latter to believe that strict performance of his contract 
would not be required and made the following pertinent 
observation, at page 750: 
There is no question that the acceptance by 
the seller of buyers' past due payments and its 
other conduct toward the buyers' leading the latter 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
to believe that strict performance would not be 
required by the seller, imposes upon the seller 
the duty of giving the buyer a reasonable notice 
before it may insist upon strict performance by 
the buyer. (Emphasis added) 
In Brown v. Chowchilla Land Compan.y, 59 Cal. App. 
164, 210 Pac. 424, at page 427, the Court states: 
The requirement of notice after the receipt 
of overdue payments, without obj·ection, is based 
upon the equitable consideration that by his con-
duct, the vendor has lead the vendee into the 
belief that the former will continue to waive the 
strict performance of the contract. (Emphasis 
added) 
While the Stewart case is not on all fours with the 
facts of ~this case, it is abundantly clear that our Court 
has recognized that the s·eller under a contract can, by 
his conduct, impose upon himself the duty to give reason-
able notice to the buyers before insisting upon strict 
performance by the buyers. In the case now at bar, the 
record discloses that the conduct of the appellant toward 
the respondents, lead the latter to believe that they would 
cooperate in obtaining a contract balance and working 
out the problem incident to transfer of the property from 
Wilcox to Oaseys. Then, without notice, all rights of 
respondents in and to the property, by virtue of said 
real estate contract, were terminated and appellants 
now attempt to take .an unconscionable advantage of 
respondent·s by a foreclosure, with its attendant costs 
and attorney fees. 
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Tht> trial eourt, after hearing the witnesses and 
:-~Pt-ing their demeanor on the witness S'tand, was im-
prP:-\:-Il'd with thit-~ facd of the evidence and was doubtless 
t•xprPssing in its findings, its statement to counsel. (See 
H 17!i lines ts-:m, R 177, lines 1-6 and R 185, lines 1 ·to 24). 
That the e.ontract states that time is of the essence, 
there can be no doubt. That the contract also gives to 
the appellants the right of foreclosure, there can prob-
ably t•qually be no doubt. However, as pointed out in 
19 Am. J ur. on Estoppel at Section 40, page 639: 
'rhe pffect of an estoppel in pais, is to pre-
vent the assertion of what would otherwise be 
an unequivocal right or to preclude what would 
otherwise be a good defense. 
Appellant has objected to the language in the Court's 
li'indings of Fact, with reference to the question of fraud. 
In 19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, Section 46, page 646, we 
read the following: 
"Estoppel in pais i·s sometimes said ·to be a 
matter of morals, and it has been stated that 
to permit the enforcement of estoppel of this 
character such as will prevent a party from 
asserting his legal rights to property, there must 
generally be some·thing turpitude in his conduct. 
In its last analysis the doctrine rests upon the 
principle of fraud, and it has been ·said that in 
cases where a party is concluded from asserting 
his original rights in consequence of his acts or 
conduct, in which ·the presence of fraud, .actual 
or constructive, is wanting are generally refer-
rable to principles, other than those of equitable 
estoppel. In many instances, however, it is neces-
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sary to ·extend the terms "fraud" or "fraudu-
lant", to situations which are more accurately 
described as "unconscionable" or "Inequitable." 
Neither actual fraud nor bad faith ·is generally 
considered an essent·ial elemen.t." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is submitted that in the case now under consider-
ation, fraud or fraudulant should come within the words 
of the Am. J ur. text cited and be more accurately de-
scribed as "unconsciona:ble" or ''inequitable." ·Ta:ken in 
this light, the Findings of Fact are each sustainable. 
The Court found: 
That appellants misrepresented the unpaid 
. balance due on the contract (R 83, paragraph 5). 
This finding is supported by the testimony of Romero 
that the balance of the contract as of September was 
$11,417.74, whereas the correct balan0e as of August, 
1963, was $11,147.75 and interest adjusting that figure 
to September, 1963, would be approximately $61.00, leav-
ing a discrepancy of approximately $209.00. (R 160, 
lines 16-18 and R 126, line~s 15 to 18. 
The trial court found: 
That respondents were mislead by appellants' 
conduct to belie·ve that Appellants would cooper-
ate in arriving at a contract balance. (R 83, para-
graph 5). 
The testimony of Romero in which he indicated that 
they would cooperate in arriving at a balance has been 
set forth in detail in a prior portion of respondents' 
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brit>f arHl need not be recited again at this point. Suffice 
it to ~ay that ~neh eonduct on the part of Romero could 
have led tlw trit>r of ,the fact to the conclusion that 
rP~pondents and Romero would work towards solution 
of the <·ontraet balance. The other Findings of Fact, 
to-wit, Findings No. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (R 83 and 
~-!) a rP each sustainable by evidence in the record and 
should be affirmed by 'this Court. 
That inequitable conduct on the part of a creditor 
will prohibit his accelerating the debt has been recognized 
oy various courts. In Mu;rphy vs. Fox et. al, (Okla.) 278 
I ~~d 820, there was a breach of the mortgage by the 
defendant through defendant's failure to pay taxes on 
the real ·estate before delinquency. Other allegations of 
dt>fault were made. The Court in that case cited the 
opinion of Chief Justice Cardoza in the leading case of 
Uraff vs. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884, 
70 A.L.R. 988 as follows: 
There is no undeviating principal that equity 
shall enforce the covenants of a mortgage, un-
moved by an appeal ad misericordiam, however 
urgent or affecting. The development of the juds-
diction of the chancery is lined with historic 
monuments that point another course. . . .One 
could give many illustrations of the traditional 
·and unchallenged exercise of a like dispensing 
power. It runs through the whole rubric of acci-
dent and mistake. Equity follows the law but not 
slavishly nor always. Hedges vs. Dixon County, 
150 U.A. 182, 192, 1 ± S. Ct. 71, 37 L. Ed. 1014. 
If it did, there could never be occasion for the 
enforcement of equitable doctrine. 13 Halsbury, 
Laws of England, page 68. 
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To all this, acceleration clauses in mortgages 
do not constitute an exception. They are not a 
class by themselves removed from interference 
by force of something peculiar in their internal 
constitution. In general, it is true that they will 
be enforced as they are written. In particular 
this has been held by a covenant in a mortgage 
accelerating the maturity of principal in default 
of punctual payment of an installment of the 
interest .... Less favor has been shown to a 
provision for acceleration of a mortgage in default 
of punctual payment of taxes or assessments. We 
have held that such a provision, though not a 
penalty in a strict or proper sense, is yet so closely 
akin thereto in view of the forfeiture of credit 
that equity will relieve ·against it if default has 
been due to mere menial inattention and if relief 
can be granted without damage to the lender. 
(Emphasis added) 
The case now under consideration is one where the 
relief asked for by respondents can be granted and with-
out damage to (the lender) appellant (emphasis added). 
The Oklahoma Court in the Murphy case went on to 
state (page 826) that: 
This Court has adhered to the principal that 
in a suit of equitable cognizence to foreclose a 
real estate mortgage the trial court may refuse 
foreclosure where there has been a technical de-
fault due to a mistruke or mere menial inattention, 
and at no damage to the mortgages security or 
prejudice to the mortgagees. 
The California Court in the case of Bisno et. al. vs. 
Sax et. al. 346 P2d 814, stated at page 821: 
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That a court of Pq uity will relieve the debtor 
from the enforcement of an acceleration clause 
whPn confronted with generall yequitable grounds 
therefore seems to be settled at law .... This is 
true where the Co1trt considers an acceleration of 
mafurit !J as a penalty or not. (Emphasis added) 
'rhe California Court then quotes the case of Bard 
v~. Uahinfried Re:alty Company, 126 Misc. 427 213 N.Y.S. 
+1, 45, as follows : 
Whatever the holding 1nay be on this matter 
of definition, the courts have shown a tendency 
to get away from the general rule, and in a num-
ber of cases have relieved mortgages from their 
defaults on the basis of doing equity. (Ibid, page 
822) 
California Court further quotes the N·ew York case of 
Casper vs. Anderson Apartments, 196 Misc., 555 94 
X.Y.S. :2nd 5·21, 525 as follows: 
There is no undeviating rule that equity must 
enforce the covenants of a mortgage regard-
less of surrounding circumstances. The whole 
system of equity jurisprudence presents an excel-
lent example of the triumph of equitable prin-
cipals over strict and inapplicable documents of 
common law .... 
The Utah Court has also recognized this rule in the 
case of Home Ou.:ners' Loan Corporation vs. Washington, 
161 P2d 355. 
Appellant makes a point of the fact that the fraud 
as shown in the Findings of Fact is not pleaded or set 
forth in partcularity nor is it set out in the pre-tria] 
order (Appellant's brief pages 13-17). In addition to 
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what has heretofore been said in this brief with refer-
ence to fraud in equitable actions being in the nature 
of unconscionable or inequitable conduct the respondents 
have the following rebuttal to appellants' argument. 
Appellant state's that: 
Respondents waive their right to raise addi-
tional defenses by not asserting those defenses 
in their answer as required by Rule 12 (h) of 
Uta;h Rules of Civil Procedure. (Appellants' brief, 
page 13.) 
The last sentence of Rule 12(h) reads as follows: 
The objection or defense, if made at the trial, 
shall be disposed of as provided in rule 15 (h) 
in the light of any evidence that may have been 
received. (Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P.) 
Rule 15 (b) titled Amendments to Conform to the 
E.vidence, states : 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amend-
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion o.f 
any party at any time after judgment; but failure 
so to amend does not effect the ~esult o'f the result 
of the trial of these issues." (Rule 15(b),U.R.C.P.) 
(Emphasis added) 
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact conform 
to the evidence submitted at the trial and that the issues 
at the trial were tried hy the ·express or complied con-
sent of the appellants who raised no objection to the 
evidence submitted to the Court with reference to the 
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i;-;:mes of fraud or Inisrepresentation, using in this con-
text the word fraud in its broadest context to include 
unconscionable or inequitable conduct. (Se-e 19 Am. Jur. 
on I~:~toppt-1, Section 46, page 646). 
The findings of the Court with reference to the 
im'quitable or unconcionable conduct giving rise to estop-
pel (R 83 and 8-l:) are within the ambit of the Court's 
prP-trial order (R 51, paragraph 2). 
The evidence sustains the findings of the trial 
court with reference to inequitable and unconscionable. 
conduct on the part of appellants and equity has clearly 
prescribed principles which would relieve respondent's 
from the harsh consequences of allowing ·appellants to 
prt>\·ail in this action and accordingly the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents have, at aU times, been ready, 
willing and able to perform under the terms of th& 
Uniform Real E'State Contract. The appeHants, by ex-
tending the simple cooperation that common courtesy 
would dictate of most, could have made this entire action 
with its attended costs and expens·es unnecessary. Sus-
taining by this Court of the trial court''S decision will 
work no hardship on appellants but will place them in. 
the position of receiving every cent which they are 
entitled to under the Uniform Real Estat'e Contract leav-
ing them w·hole. But for Appellants' conduct all pay-
ments would have been made before acceleration. 
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Accordingly, respondents respectfully subn1it that 
the judgment of the trial court was correct and should 
be affirmed. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
L. Brent Hoggan 
Kiston & Bettilyon 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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